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The Supreme Court in 2014 
2014 was a relatively quiet year for the UK Supreme Court. For a start, there were no 
changes of personnel. Barring unforeseen circumstances there will again be no changes 
during 2015, since the next retirement amongst the 12 Justices (that of Lord Toulson) is not 
due until September 2016. In addition, the number of decisions published in 2014 (68) was 
more or less in line with the annual average since the Court’s formation in 2009: the figure of 
81 decisions in 2013 now looks like a blip. And there were fewer than usual high-profile 
appeals, the only really prominent decision being that in the assisted suicide case of 
Nicklinson [2014] UKSC 38. 
Appeals heard 
Astonishingly Lord Neuberger, the President of the Court, sat in 46 of the decided cases 
(68%) and Lady Hale, the Deputy President, sat in 34 (50%). The other Justices sat in 
between 22 and 32 cases. Seven of the cases were dealt with by more than five judges: six 
engaged seven judges but only one (Nicklinson) engaged nine.  
In all, 82 appeals were dealt with within the 68 decisions issued. As in the two previous years 
a sizeable number were Scottish appeals (11 – 13%), with three from Northern Ireland. The 
success rate was 48% (39 appeals), which is exactly the same percentage as in 2013. At least 
30 of the 82 appeals related to applications for judicial review.  
Judgments issued 
Once again a noticeable feature of the 2014 decisions was the number that took the form of 
sole judgments. There were 36 of these (53%), with each Justice delivering at least one. This 
is similar to the figure of 57% for 2013. Lord Neuberger, Lord Kerr and Lord Reed each 
delivered five sole judgments. Under Lord Neuberger’s presidency there has been a clear 
move towards producing decisions to which all of the sitting Justices can subscribe, the aim 
being to make the law more certain.  
But old habits die hard. In Lawrence v Fen Tigers Ltd [2014] UKSC 13, a case on whether 
noise caused by motor sports constituted a nuisance, Lord Neuberger issued the longest single 
judgment of the year (153 paragraphs), with which his four colleagues all agreed. But Lords 
Mance, Sumption and Clarke each felt that they had to add a few supplementary paragraphs 
of their own, while Lord Carnwath took as many as 75 paragraphs to explain his reasoning in 
his preferred words. 
Lord Neuberger delivered the highest number of judgments overall (22), and Lady Hale the 
next highest (18). Each of the other Justices delivered between 9 and 14 judgments. In total, 
149 judgments were issued, an average of just over two per case. The average length of 
decisions rose to 85 paragraphs per case, up from an average of 71 in 2013. Nicklinson was 
by far the longest (366 paragraphs), and four other cases required more than 200 paragraphs. 
But 12 cases were dealt with in fewer than 35 paragraphs.   
Dissents and ad hoc judges 
The age of dissent is far from dead, for there were dissenting judgments (in whole or in part) 
in 14 cases (22%), up from 14% in 2013. There were eight cases in which the Justices were 
split 3 v 2 on one or more key issues, and one in which they were split 4 v 3 (this was Surrey 
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County Council v P [2014] UKSC 19). Strangely, all 12 Justices were on the minority side in 
at least one of these cases, with Lords Ker and Wilson appearing twice and Lord Carnwath 
three times. Lord Wilson was the most prolific dissenter overall: he disagreed with his 
colleagues in five of the 24 cases in which he sat.   
One of the three ad hoc judges who sat during the year, Lord Collins, also dissented in one of 
his two cases. Lord Dyson MR and Lord Thomas CJ sat in one case apiece as ad hoc judges, 
the latter in In re Agricultural Sector (Wales) Bill [2014] UKSC 43. This was a fulfilment of 
Lord Neuberger’s promise in 2013 that, on any appeal involving Welsh devolution issues, the 
Supreme Court panel would if possible include a judge who has specifically Welsh 
experience and knowledge (the LCJ, of course, is Welsh). In the case in question the Supreme 
Court upheld the competence of the Welsh Assembly to make the Bill at issue but pointed out 
that, just because the Government of Wales Act 2006 is of great constitutional significance, 
this cannot by itself be taken as a guide to its interpretation: it has to be interpreted in the 
same way as any other statute. 
Subject matter 
There was the usual eclectic mix of topics dealt with in the appeals, but besides the public 
law cases dealt with through judicial review there was a sizeable number of civil damages 
claims (12) and of land and housing cases (8). Human rights featured in 17 cases. There were, 
by my reckoning, four cases in each of the categories of criminal law, trust law, commercial 
law, tax law and constitutional law. There were just two or three concerned with immigration 
law, employment law, company law, family law or succession law. EU law was considered in 
six cases and just one reference was made to the Court of Justice in Luxembourg (HM 
Revenue and Custom Commissioners v Secret Hotels 2 Ltd [2014] UKSC 16). 
Judicial deference 
The public law cases tended to display judicial restraint. When a group of peers and MPs 
complained about the government’s refusal to let an Iranian dissident into the UK to address 
a meeting, all but Lord Kerr agreed with the government’s line (R (Lord Carlile) v Home 
Secretary [2014] UKSC 60). However they did so after making their own assessment of the 
proportionality of the dissident’s exclusion and upbraided the Court of Appeal for merely 
asking itself if the Home Secretary had approached the matter lawfully.  
Similarly, in R (Buckinghamshire County Council) v Secretary of State for Transport [2014] 
UKSC 3 seven Justices upheld the government’s handling of the HS2 railway project, saying 
that using the hybrid Bill procedure in Parliament would not breach any EU Directive. But 
the fact that the Supreme Court was itself prepared to consider what parliamentary procedure 
was appropriate in this context is itself an indication that at times judges are willing to come 
close to challenging the supremacy of Parliament, at least when EU law is involved. 
In R (Sandiford) v Foreign Secretary [2014] UKSC 44 the Supreme Court upheld the Foreign 
Secretary’s ‘blanket’ policy of not paying for legal representation for British citizens facing 
trials abroad, even if the person is confronting the death penalty, as Mrs Sandiford was in 
Indonesia. The Justices ruled that Mrs Sandiford was not within the UK’s ‘jurisdiction’ for 
the purposes of the ECHR, but they did urge the Foreign Secretary to re-consider her 
application for legal assistance. 
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The decision in Nicklinson perhaps illustrates better than any other the range of judicial 
attitudes within the Court to judicial activism. Five Justices thought that they did have the 
constitutional authority to make a declaration that the general prohibition on assisted suicide 
in section 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 was incompatible with Article 8 of the ECHR (the right 
to a private life). But four Justices thought that the matter was better left to Parliament’s 
assessment. Of the five ‘activists’ only two wanted to issue a declaration (Lady Hale and 
Lord Kerr), while the other three declined to do so (Lords Neuberger, Mance and Wilson). 
The four judges preferring a more restrained approach were Lords Sumption, Clarke, Hughes 
and Reed. Lord Toulson heard the case at the Court of Appeal, where he too made it clear 
that he approved of a more restrained approach. We do not know how the remaining Justices, 
Lords Carnwath and Hodge, would have decided the case but it is in any event clear that the 
Court is fairly evenly divided as regards the appropriateness of treading on Parliament’s toes. 
Human rights 
In other cases the Supreme Court was more sympathetic to human rights claims. In R (T) v 
Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police [2014] UKSC 35 it confirmed a declaration of 
incompatibility in relation to sections in the Police Act 1997 which allowed the disclosure in 
enhanced criminal record certificates of cautions and warnings issued many years earlier for 
minor offences. The majority of the Court (Lord Wilson dissented) said the sections breached 
the requirement of legality because they provided no safeguards against arbitrary interference 
and failed the test of being necessary in a democratic society. 
In R (EM (Eritrea)) v Home Secretary [2014] UKSC 12 the Court ruled that the fact that 
there was a presumption that all EU states would comply with their international obligations 
regarding asylum claims did not remove the need to examine evidence as to whether in fact 
those obligations would be fulfilled in a particular state (in this case Italy). The applicant does 
not need to show that there is a systemic defect in a country’s processes.  
On the other hand, in a further case concerning asylum, IA (Iran) v Home Secretary [2014] 
UKSC 6, the Supreme Court held that, just because the applicant had been granted refugee 
status by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in both Iraq and Turkey, this did not 
create a presumption in favour of his being granted refugee status in the UK. Nor did it shift 
to the government the burden of proving that its decision to refuse asylum was wrong. 
In A v BBC [2014] UKSC 25 the Justices confirmed that courts have an inherent power to 
make exceptions to the open justice principle by withholding certain information from public 
disclosure, including the identity of parties or witnesses, not just to protect the public interest 
in the administration of justice but also to protect an individual’s right not to be subjected to 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Here the Court kept secret the identity of a 
man who was being deported after committing sex offences against children.   
Dialogue with the ECtHR 
On three occasions the Justices engaged significantly with jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights. In Surrey County Council v P [2014] UKSC 19 they held by 4 v 3 
that the disabled appellants were indeed being deprived of their liberty by the manner in 
which they were being cared for in residential premises. The dissenters (Lords Carnwath, 
Hodge and Clarke) were of the view that the Strasbourg Court had not yet gone so far as to 
characterise this kind of living arrangement as a deprivation of liberty.   
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In Kennedy v The Charity Commission [2014] UKSC 20 the majority concluded that the 
Grand Chamber of the Strasbourg Court had not yet interpreted Article 10 of the ECHR in 
such a way as to impose on public authorities a freestanding duty to disclose information. 
Lords Wilson and Carnwath disagreed on the basis that it seemed likely that the European 
Court would soon move to assert such a duty. Unfortunately no Justice was able to find a rule 
within the common law which imposed a similar duty. 
In R (Kaiyam) v Secretary of State for Justice [2014] UKSC 66 the Court had to consider 
whether it was a breach of Article 5 of the ECHR not to provide opportunities for 
rehabilitation to prisoners whose release depended on their being able to demonstrate that 
their continued detention was no longer necessary for public protection. Ingeniously the 
Justices held that, while such an ancillary duty can be implied into Article 5, which if 
breached can give rise to compensation, a breach would not of itself render the detention 
unlawful. This goes directly against the position as stated in James v UK (2012) 56 EHRR 
399 and the Strasbourg Court will no doubt have something to say about that in due course. 
Employment rights 
Two significant decisions enhanced employment rights. In Bates van Winkelhof v Clyde & Co 
LLP [2014] UKSC 32 the protection of whistle-blowing legislation was extended to partners 
in a firm of solicitors, even though partners are not normally considered to be employees. 
And in Hounga v Allen [2014] UKSC 47 an illegal immigrant was held to be entitled to claim 
discrimination against her employer because her claim was not so closely connected to her 
illegal entry into the country that permitting recovery of compensation would appear to be 
condoning the illegality.      
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